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Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
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Artikel-Nr:
9783642358227
Veröffentl:
2013
Einband:
eBook
Seiten:
168
Autor:
Demet Çetiner
Serie:
668, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
Reflowable eBook
Kopierschutz:
Digital Watermark [Social-DRM]
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:
This book examines fair revenue proportions for airline alliances. It looks at the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly, and develops a new selfish revenue allocation rule.
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Introduction.- Selected Topics in Revenue Management.- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances.- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory.- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game.- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances.- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances.- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices.- Conclusion and Future Research.- Appendix: Computational Study.