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Autor: Martin Brunner
ISBN-13: 9783531196121
Einband: eBook
Seiten: 164
Sprache: Englisch
eBook Typ: PDF
eBook Format: eBook
Kopierschutz: Adobe DRM [Hard-DRM]
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Parliaments and Legislative Activity

Studien zur Neuen Politischen Ökonomie
Motivations for Bill Introduction
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Martin Brunner aims at solving the puzzle of why opposition parties or government backbenchers propose legislation even though the chance to influence policy outcomes in this manner is almost nil. He argues that instead of influencing policies directly most parliamentary bills serve different purposes: They are used in order to signal own policy positions and to show alternatives to government policies. Or they point at topics that rank high on the public agenda but low on the government agenda. They can also be a means for individual Members of Parliament to build up an independent personal profile. Using formal models and comparative empirical evidence from Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom the author shows that parliamentary initiatives of opposition and backbenchers are not simply “much ado about nothing”, but the result of vote-seeking motivations.
?The Puzzle of Parliamentary Bill Introduction.- Parliamentary Bills as Party Policy Signals.- Public Opinion and Parliamentary Activities.- Private Members’ Bills between Party and Constituency.

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Autor: Martin Brunner
ISBN-13 :: 9783531196121
ISBN: 353119612X
Verlag: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH
Seiten: 164
Sprache: Englisch
Auflage 2013
Sonstiges: Ebook, Martin Brunner aims at solving the puzzle of why opposition parties or government backbenchers propose legislation even though the chance to influence policy outcomes in this manner is almost nil. He argues that instead of influencing policies directly most parliamentary bills serve different purposes: They are used in order to signal own policy positions and to show alternatives to government policies. Or they point at topics that rank high on the public agenda but low on the government agenda.