Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia
Beschreibung:
This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.
The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019The Political ContextMain Arguments and Chapter Plan
Chapter 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016The Kargil ConflictThe "Twin Peaks" CrisisThe 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist AttacksThe Uri Attack and Indian "Surgical Strikes"
Chapter 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016Nuclear DeterrenceU.S. Crisis ManagementPoor Conventional Military OptionsStrategic RestraintConclusion
Chapter 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia TodayThe Concept of Deterrence StabilityIndia-Pakistan Relations after the February 2019 CrisisIndian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and ControlThe Nature of "Ugly Stability" between India and PakistanThe Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear DeterrenceConclusion: Deterrence Stability in South Asia?
Chapter 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence StabilityTrendsMeasures to Enhance Deterrence StabilityThe U.S. Role