Contents
Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein
Findings and Conclusions
Executive Summary
I. Background on the Committee Study
II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program
A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals
B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
C. Interrogation in Country and the January 2003 Guidelines
D. The Detention and Interrogation of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
E. Tensions with Country Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees
F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh
G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
H. The Growth of the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program
I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues
J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003
K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court
L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers as Ongoing Problem
M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005
N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA s Detention and Interrogation Program
III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies
A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations
B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques as Having Saved Lives, Thwarted Plots, and Captured Terrorists
D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees
E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a High Volume of Critical Intelligence
F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations The Use of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots and Capture Additional Terrorists
G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified
A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who Then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories
B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to Put Out Our Story to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed
C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed