The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995

Edited by Timothy R. Walton - Contributions by Jonathan R. Alger; Pia Antolic-Piper; Anamaria Berea; Steven L. Burg; Bob de Graaff; Frances Flannery; William Hawk; John Hulsey; Bernd Kaussler; Jonathan Keller; David McGraw; Mark Piper; John A. Scherpereel

In the summer of 2013 the Central Intelligence Agency and the Clinton Presidential Library made an unprecedented declassification of more than 300 documents showing the role of intelligence in supporting American decision-making on Bosnia in the 1990s, and in particular the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, which brought an end to the fighting in Bosnia. The following spring, James Madison University hosted a conference in which scholars from all over the world assessed what the documents show about what is needed for the complex process of making peace. Aspects covered included military, political, diplomatic, and religious, among others. Timothy R. Walton's The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995 offers a collection of papers presented at the conference; several of the authors were participants in the events of the time.

Foreword: Navigating from War to Peace: Enduring Challenges for Presidents and Citizens, Jonathan R. AlgerChapter 1: The Historical and Bureaucratic Context of the Declassified Documents, Timothy R. WaltonChapter 2: Beyond Bosnia: Ethnical Reasoning in Political Deliberations about Humanitarian Intervention, Pia Antolic-Piper, William Hawk, David McGraw, and Mark PiperChapter 3: New Lessons from the War in Bosnia - An Analysis Using Computational Methods, Anamaria BereaChapter 4: Conflict Frames and the Timing of U.S. Intervention in Bosnia, John Hulsey and John A. ScherpereelChapter 5: Analytic Intelligence and Bosnia Policymaking in the Clinton Administration, Steven L. BurgChapter 6: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy toward Bosnia, 1993-95: National Identity, Credibility, and the 'Stalemate Machine', Bernd Kaussler, Jonathan Keller, and Yi Edward YangChapter 7: Towards a New Social Memory of the Bosnian Genocide: Countering Al-Qaeda's Radicalization Myth with the CIA "Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency" Archive, Frances FlanneryChapter 8: The Impact of Intelligence on DOD Perceptions of the Bosnian Conflict, 1995, Jonathan SmithChapter 9: Fallen Off the Priority List: Was Srebrenica an Intelligence Failure?, Bob De Graaff and Cees WiebesChapter 10: The Compromises Necessary to Get the Final Deal, Timothy R. WaltonAppendix: Principles Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993