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Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities
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Monetary Policy and Wage Bargaining Institutions in EMU
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Artikel-Nr:
9781475740622
Veröffentl:
2013
Einband:
PDF
Seiten:
278
Autor:
Robert Franzese
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
PDF
Kopierschutz:
Adobe DRM [Hard-DRM]
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:
This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on "e;Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities"e; This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.
This important collection presents an authoritative selection of papers on "e;Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities"e; This publication is intent on building bridges between economics and the other social sciences. The focus is on the interaction between monetary policy and wage bargaining institutions in European Monetary Union (EMU). Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is written by acknowledged experts in their field. The outcome is a broad analysis of the interactions of labour market actors and central banks. The volume addresses the recent changes in EMU. An important theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant conclusion that emerges from Institutional Conflicts and Complementarities is that even perfectly credible monetary conservatism has long-term real effects, even in equilibrium models with fully rational expectations.