Knowledge, Belief, and Character

This is a unique collection of new and recently-published articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief. The readings all contribute to our understanding of the relative importance, for a theory of justified belief, of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and of the individuals responsibility in gathering and weighing evidence. Highlights of the readings include direct exchanges between leading exponents of this approach and their critics.

There have been many books over the past decade, including outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a strong and growing interest in theintellectual virtues and in the development of virtue-theoretic approaches inepistemology. There have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with Ernest Sosa'sKnowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and extending to Linda Zabzebski'sVirtue of the Mind (Cambridge, 1996).
Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig'sThe Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet'sEpistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together the best contributions of the influential authors working in this growing area of epistemological research, and to create a collection of essays as a useful course text and research source.
Several of the articles included in the volume are previously unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach ofvirtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier," and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute

Part 1 Acknowledgements
Part 2 Introduction
Part 3 Reliability and Intellectual Virtue
Chapter 4 Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. Alvin Goldman
Chapter 5 Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue. Ernest Sosa
Chapter 6 Three Forms of Virtue Epistemology. Ernest Sosa
Chapter 7 Ever Since Descartes. Hilary Kornblith
Part 8 Knowledge and Skepticism
Chapter 9 Virtue, Skepticism, and Context. John Greco
Chapter 10 Supervenience, Virtues, and Consequences. Jonathan Dancy
Chapter 11 Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and "Aptness". Lawrence BonJour
Chapter 12 Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour. Ernest Sosa
Part 13 Responsibility, Motives, and Consequences
Chapter 14 From Reabilism to Virtue Epistemology. Linda Zagrebsky
Chapter 15 Moral and Epistemic Virtue. Julia Driver
Chapter 16 An "Internalist" Conception of Epistemic Virtue. James Montmarquet
Chapter 17 Regulating Inquiry: Virtue, Doubt, and Sentiment. Christopher Hookway
Part 18 Special Interest Topics in Virtue Theory
Chapter 19 Critical Thinking, Moral Integrity, and Citizenship: Teaching for the Intellectual Virtues. Richard Paul
Chapter 20 Virtue Theory and the Fact/ Value Problem. Guy Axtell
Chapter 21 Epistemic Vice. Casey Swank
Chapter 22 Phronesis and Religious Belief. Linda Zagrebski
Part 23 Index of Names
Part 24 About the Contributors