Explaining the Mental

The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have taken place over the last century in the human and cognitive sciences - most notably, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurophysiology, AI, and cognitive science itself. In all these sciences, there is a need to delineate the domain of the mental and to elucidate the key concepts and underlying assumptions. This need is widely recognized, but approaches and answers vary significantly. Some stress the representational features involved in most of our mental processes, others the inferential dimension; some stress the necessity of using empirical data, others the need to refine ideas before pursuing and drawing on empirical research. The papers collected in this volume are grouped into four parts, on language and thought, on knowledge, belief and action, on intentionality, and on naturalism. The volume will be welcomed by all those engaged and interested in debates about the mental in philosophy and the human and cognitive sciences.Table of ContentsPART I: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHTAndrew Woodfield, Public Words Considered as Vehicles of ThinkingAndrea Bianchi, Speaking and Thinking (Or: A More Kaplanian Wayto a Unified Account of Language and Thought)Stefano Predelli, The Strange Case of the Missing ConstituentPART II: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND ACTIONPascal Engel, Taking Seriously Knowledge as a Mental State Carlo Gabbani, Epistemology and the Eliminative StanceJennifer Hornsby, Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for ActingWolfgang Kuenne, Some Varieties of DeceptionPART III: INTENTIONALITYSandro Nannini, Intentionality NaturalisedElisabetta Sacchi, Thought and Thinking: the Ontological Ground ofIntentionalityElisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?PART IV: NATURALISMMarcello Frixione, Do Concepts exist? A Naturalistic Point of ViewTim Crane, Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challengeof the Explanatory GapAchim Stephan and Robert C. Richardson, What Physicalism ShouldProvide Us WithMario De Caro, The Claims of Naturalism

The aim of this collection of papers is to present different philosophical perspectives on the mental, exploring questions about how to define, explain and understand the various kinds of mental acts and processes, and exhibiting, in particular, the contrast between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches. There is a long tradition in philosophy of clarifying concepts such as those of thinking, knowing and believing. The task of clarifying these concepts has become ever more important with the major developments that have taken place over the last century in the human and cognitive sciences - most notably, psychology, sociology, linguistics, neurophysiology, AI, and cognitive science itself. In all these sciences, there is a need to delineate the domain of the mental and to elucidate the key concepts and underlying assumptions. This need is widely recognized, but approaches and answers vary significantly. Some stress the representational features involved in most of our mental processes, others the inferential dimension; some stress the necessity of using empirical data, others the need to refine ideas before pursuing and drawing on empirical research. The papers collected in this volume are grouped into four parts, on language and thought, on knowledge, belief and action, on intentionality, and on naturalism. The volume will be welcomed by all those engaged and interested in debates about the mental in philosophy and the human and cognitive sciences.Table of ContentsPART I: LANGUAGE AND THOUGHTAndrew Woodfield, Public Words Considered as Vehicles of ThinkingAndrea Bianchi, Speaking and Thinking (Or: A More Kaplanian Wayto a Unified Account of Language and Thought)Stefano Predelli, The Strange Case of the Missing ConstituentPART II: KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF AND ACTIONPascal Engel, Taking Seriously Knowledge as a Mental State Carlo Gabbani, Epistemology and the Eliminative StanceJennifer Hornsby, Knowledge, Belief and Reasons for ActingWolfgang Kuenne, Some Varieties of DeceptionPART III: INTENTIONALITYSandro Nannini, Intentionality NaturalisedElisabetta Sacchi, Thought and Thinking: the Ontological Ground ofIntentionalityElisabeth Pacherie, Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?PART IV: NATURALISMMarcello Frixione, Do Concepts exist? A Naturalistic Point of ViewTim Crane, Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: the Challengeof the Explanatory GapAchim Stephan and Robert C. Richardson, What Physicalism ShouldProvide Us WithMario De Caro, The Claims of Naturalism