Regulation by Municipal Licensing

Municipal licensing serves a variety of regulatory purposes such as consumer protection and public health and safety. The municipal licensing power is delegated from the provincial government, up to the present, municipalities have been restricted to enumerated, specific powers, and the result has been the growth of a disorganized and unwieldy accumulation of bylaws, many of which conflict or are obsolete. The development of a two-tier system of municipal government, exemplified by Metropolitan Toronto, adds to the complexity of the issues. Basing their analysis upon municipal experience in Ontario, the authors envisage a reorganized system in which provincial and municipal powers will be exercised more rationally to deal with problems at the level at which they tend to occur.

Municipal licensing in practice is the topic of a study of the cartage and taxicab industries in a number of Canadian and American cities. Comparisons of industry structure in differing regulatory environments lead to the conclusion that entry controls are not justified by their results.

Municipal licensing serves a variety of regulatory purposes such as consumer protection and public health and safety. The municipal licensing power is delegated from the provincial government, up to the present, municipalities have been restricted to enumerated, specific powers, and the result has been the growth of a disorganized and unwieldy accumulation of bylaws, many of which conflict or are obsolete. The development of a two-tier system of municipal government, exemplified by Metropolitan Toronto, adds to the complexity of the issues. Basing their analysis upon municipal experience in Ontario, the authors envisage a reorganized system in which provincial and municipal powers will be exercised more rationally to deal with problems at the level at which they tend to occur.

Municipal licensing in practice is the topic of a study of the cartage and taxicab industries in a number of Canadian and American cities. Comparisons of industry structure in differing regulatory environments lead to the conclusion that entry controls are not justified by their results.