Organization at the Limit

The book offers important insight relevant to Corporate, Government and Global organizations management in general. The internationally recognised authors tackle vital issues in decision making, how organizational risk is managed, how can technological and organizational complexities interact, what are the impediments for effective learning and how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Managers, organizational consultants, expert professionals, and training specialists; particularly those in high risk organizations, may find the issues covered in the book relevant to their daily work and a potential catalyst for thought and action. A timely analysis of the Columbia disaster and the organizational lessons that can be learned from it. Includes contributions from those involved in the Investigation Board report into the incident. Tackles vital issues such as the role of time pressures and goal conflict in decision making, and the impediments for effective learning. Examines how organizational risk is managed and how technological and organizational complexities interact. Assesses how large, medium, and small organizations can, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Questions our eagerness to embrace new technologies, yet reluctance to accept the risks of innovation. Offers a step by step understanding of the complex factors that led to disaster.

The book offers important insight relevant to Corporate, Governmentand Global organizations management in general. The internationallyrecognised authors tackle vital issues in decision making, howorganizational risk is managed, how can technological andorganizational complexities interact, what are the impediments foreffective learning and how large, medium, and small organizationscan, and in fact must, increase their resilience. Managersorganizational consultants, expert professionals, and trainingspecialists; particularly those in high risk organizations, mayfind the issues covered in the book relevant to their daily workand a potential catalyst for thought and action.* A timely analysis of the Columbia disaster and theorganizational lessons that can be learned from it.* Includes contributions from those involved in the InvestigationBoard report into the incident.* Tackles vital issues such as the role of time pressures andgoal conflict in decision making, and the impediments for effectivelearning.* Examines how organizational risk is managed and howtechnological and organizational complexities interact.* Assesses how large, medium, and small organizations can, and infact must, increase their resilience.* Questions our eagerness to embrace new technologies, yetreluctance to accept the risks of innovation.* Offers a step by step understanding of the complex factors thatled to disaster.

Notes on contributors.Foreword: Sean O'Keefe.Part I: Introduction.1 Introduction: Organizational Aspects of the Columbia Disaster:Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck (New York University).Part II: The Context of the Disaster.2 History and Policy in the Space Shuttle Program: Moshe Farjoun(New York University).3 System Effects: On Slippery Slopes, Repeating NegativePatterns, and Learning from Mistake? Diane Vaughan (BostonCollege).4 Organizational Learning and Action in the Midst of SafetyDrift: Revisiting the Space Shuttle Program's Recent History:Moshe Farjoun (New York University).5 The Space Between in Space Transportation: A RelationalAnalysis of the Failure of STS-107: Karlene H. Roberts, Peter M.Madsen, Vinit M. Desai (University of CaliforniaBerkley).Part III: Influences on decision making.6 The Opacity of Risk: Language and the Culture of Safety inNASA's Space Shuttle Program: Willie Ocasio (NorthwesternUniversity).7 Coping with Temporal Uncertainty: When Rigid, AmbitiousDeadlines Don't Make Sense: Sally Blount (New YorkUniversity), Mary Waller (Tulane University), and Sophie Leroy (NewYork University).8 Attention to Production Schedule and Safety as Determinants ofRisk-Taking in NASA's Decision to Launch the ColumbiaShuttle: Angela Buljan (University of Zagreb) and Zur Shapira (NewYork University).Part IV: The Imaging Debate.9 Making Sense of Blurred Images: Mindful Organizing in MissionSTS-107: Karl Weick (University of Michigan).10 The Price of Progress: Structurally Induced Inaction: ScottA. Snook and Jeffrey C. Connor (Harvard University).11 Data Indeterminacy: One NASA, Two Modes: Raghu Garud andRoger Dunbar (New York University).12 The Recovery Window: Organizational Learning FollowingAmbiguous Threats: Amy C. Edmondson, Michael A. Roberto, RichardM.J. Bohmer, Erika M. Ferlins, Laura R. Feldman (HarvardUniversity).13 Barriers to the Interpretation and Diffusion of Informationabout Potential Problems in Organizations: Lessons from the SpaceShuttle Columbia: Frances Milliken, Theresa K. Lant, and EbonyBridwell-Mitchell (New York University).Part V: Beyond Explanation.14 Systems Approaches to Safety: NASA and the Space ShuttleDisasters: Nancy Leveson, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, John S.Carroll, Betty Barrett, Alexander Brown, Nicolas Dulac, LydiaFraile, and Karen Marais (MIT).15 Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience fromColumbia: David Woods (Ohio State).16 Making NASA More Effective: William H. Starbuck (New YorkUniversity) and Johnny Stevenson (NASA).17 Observations on the Columbia Accident: Henry McDonald(University of Tennessee).Part VI: Conclusion.18 Conclusion: Moshe Farjoun and William H. Starbuck (New YorkUniversity).Index