The Continent of International Law

Barbara Koremenos is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She has published in both political science and law journals, including the American Political Science Review, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Legal Studies, and Law and Contemporary Problems. Koremenos received a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for her research - the first such winner to study international relations and law. She has been invited to give seminars at academic institutions in the United States, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain and Switzerland, and has spoken at the American Embassy in Copenhagen as well as forming part of a small-group panel at the State Department to discuss issues of nuclear proliferation.

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained. Theoretically, Koremenos develops hypotheses regarding how cooperation problems like incentives to cheat can be confronted and moderated through law's detailed design provisions. Empirically, she exploits her data set composed of a random sample of international agreements in economics, the environment, human rights and security. Her theory and testing leads to a consequential discovery: considering the vagaries of international politics, international cooperation looks more law-like than anarchical, with the detailed provisions of international law chosen in ways that increase the prospects and robustness of cooperation. This nuanced and sophisticated 'continent of international law' can speak to scholars in any discipline where institutions, and thus institutional design, matter.

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international agreements. This book demonstrates theoretically and empirically how the detailed design provisions of such international law matter for phenomena that scholars, policymakers, and the public care about: when and how international cooperation occurs and is maintained.

1. (Re)discovering the continent; Part I. Coil's Building Blocks: Theory and Data: Introduction to Part I; 2. Theoretical framework; 3. The coil sample; Appendix to chapter 3 coding rules; Part II. Flexibility Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part II; 4. Duration provisions; 5. Escape clauses and withdrawal clauses; 6. (Im)precision and reservations; Part III. Centralization, Scope, and Control Provisions in the Design of International Law: Introduction to Part III; 7. Dispute resolution provisions; 8. Punishment provisions; 9. Monitoring provisions; 10. Asymmetric design rules, voting, and power; 11. Conclusion; Appendix 1. List of agreements in coil sample; Appendix 2. Selection issues in international cooperation data sets.