The Labor-Managed Firm

Gregory K. Dow has been Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia since 1995 and chaired the economics department during 2001¿6. He has held previous academic positions at the University of Alberta and Yale University, Connecticut. His articles have appeared in the leading journals of the profession, including the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy. His previous book Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice was published by Cambridge in 2003.

This book uses economic theory to argue that labor-managed firms are rare due to market failures rather than any inherent organizational defects.

Part I. Setting the Stage: 1. The puzzling asymmetry; Part II. Perfection and Symmetry: 2. Profit maximization and control rights; 3. The labor-managed firm in the short run; 4. The labor-managed firm in the long run; 5. The labor-managed firm in general equilibrium; Part III. Imperfection and Asymmetry: 6. Empirical asymmetries (I); 7. Empirical asymmetries (II); 8. The rarity of labor-managed firms; Part IV. Appropriation Problems: 9. Imperfect appropriation; 10. Firm formation with adverse selection; 11. Partnership markets with adverse selection; Part V. Public Good Problems: 12. Collective choice and investor takeovers; 13. Free riding and employee buyouts; Part VI. Opportunism Problems (I): 14. Transaction cost economics; 15. Firm-specific investments; Part VII. Opportunism Problems (II): 16. Asset ownership and work incentives; 17. Capital stocks and labor flows; 18. Honest and dishonest controllers; Part VIII. Synthesis and Agenda: 19. Breaking the symmetry; 20. Policy directions.