Essence of Indecision

Essence of Indecision
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Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963
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Artikel-Nr:
9780773576124
Veröffentl:
2009
Einband:
PDF
Seiten:
264
Autor:
Patricia I. McMahon
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
PDF
Kopierschutz:
Adobe DRM [Hard-DRM]
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:

Tracing Diefenbaker's deliberations over nuclear policy, McMahon shows that Diefenbaker was politically cautious, not indecisive - he wanted to acquire nuclear weapons and understood from public opinion polls that most Canadians supported this position. However, Diefenbaker worried that the growing anti-nuclear movement might sway public opinion sufficiently to undermine his political support. He also feared that Liberal leader Lester Pearson could use the issue for political advantage. As long as Pearson opposed Canada's membership in the nuclear club, he could portray Diefenbaker's government as an irresponsible proponent of nuclear proliferation. Despite these reservations, Diefenbaker was involved in nuclear negotiations with the Americans throughout his tenure as prime minister, and an agreement was within reach on a number of occasions. When, in January 1963, Pearson reversed his position, Diefenbaker felt trapped - in making a clear public statement in favour of nuclear weapons it would appear as though he was merely following his opponent's lead. When Canada acquired nuclear weapons in 1963, it was under the leadership of Pearson, not Diefenbaker.
Tracing Diefenbaker's deliberations over nuclear policy, McMahon shows that Diefenbaker was politically cautious, not indecisive - he wanted to acquire nuclear weapons and understood from public opinion polls that most Canadians supported this position. However, Diefenbaker worried that the growing anti-nuclear movement might sway public opinion sufficiently to undermine his political support. He also feared that Liberal leader Lester Pearson could use the issue for political advantage. As long as Pearson opposed Canada's membership in the nuclear club, he could portray Diefenbaker's government as an irresponsible proponent of nuclear proliferation. Despite these reservations, Diefenbaker was involved in nuclear negotiations with the Americans throughout his tenure as prime minister, and an agreement was within reach on a number of occasions. When, in January 1963, Pearson reversed his position, Diefenbaker felt trapped - in making a clear public statement in favour of nuclear weapons it would appear as though he was merely following his opponent's lead. When Canada acquired nuclear weapons in 1963, it was under the leadership of Pearson, not Diefenbaker.

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