Hamilton’s Paradox
- 0 %
Der Artikel wird am Ende des Bestellprozesses zum Download zur Verfügung gestellt.

Hamilton’s Paradox

The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
 PDF
Sofort lieferbar | Lieferzeit: Sofort lieferbar I

Unser bisheriger Preis:ORGPRICE: 23,11 €

Jetzt 23,10 €*

ISBN-13:
9780511133565
Einband:
PDF
Seiten:
0
Autor:
Jonathan A. Rodden
Serie:
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
eBook Typ:
PDF
eBook Format:
PDF
Kopierschutz:
Adobe DRM [Hard-DRM]
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:

As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.