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A Course in Game Theory
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Artikel-Nr:
9780262650403
Veröffentl:
1994
Erscheinungsdatum:
12.07.1994
Seiten:
368
Autor:
Ariel Rubinstein
Gewicht:
483 g
Format:
227x151x24 mm
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:
Martin J. Osborne is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto.
Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.
Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.
A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
Presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts
"I recommend this book highly, it is beautifully done..." Robert Aumann , Hebrew University
Part 1 Introduction: game theory; games and solutions; game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium; rational behaviour; the steady state and deductive interpretations; bounded rationality; terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium; mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium; rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions; knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information; bargaining games; repeated games; complexity considerations in repeated games; implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information; sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core; stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value; the Nash solution.