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The Appearance of Ignorance
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Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 2
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Artikel-Nr:
9780199564477
Veröffentl:
2018
Erscheinungsdatum:
18.03.2018
Seiten:
320
Autor:
Keith DeRose
Gewicht:
680 g
Format:
236x157x25 mm
Sprache:
Englisch
Beschreibung:
Keith DeRose is Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. He works mainly in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. He received his PhD from UCLA, and taught at New York University and Rice University before Yale. He is the author of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Assertion, and Context, Volume 1 (OUP, 2009)
Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary with context, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. This volume presents, develops, and defends contextualist solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: the puzzles of skeptical hypotheses and of lotteries. It is argued that, at least by ordinary standards for knowledge, we do know that skeptical hypotheses are false, and that we've lost the lottery. Why it seems that we don't know that they're false tells us a lot, both about what knowledge is and how knowledge attributions work.
The Appearance of Ignorance is the companion volume to Keith DeRose's 2009 title The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1.
The Appearance of Ignorance is the companion volume to Keith DeRose's 2009 title The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Volume 1.
Keith DeRose presents, develops, and defends original solutions to two of the stickiest problems in epistemology: skeptical hypotheses and the lottery problem. He deploys a powerful version of contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards for the attribution of knowledge vary with context.
- 1: Solving the Skeptical Problem
- 2: Moorean Methodology: Was the Skeptic Doomed to Inevitable Defeat?
- 3: Two Substantively Moorean Responses and the Project of Refuting Skepticism
- 4: Contextualism and Skepticism: The Defeat of the Bold Skeptic
- 5: Lotteries, Insensitivity, and Closure
- 6: Insensitivity
- 7: How Do We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats? Toward A Picture of Knowledge
- Appendices