Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification

Against various detractors (e.g. Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson, etc.), this book develops a foundationalist theory of epistemic justification. In contrast with Laurence BonJour and borrowing from John McDowell, the essential argument is that conceptualized perpetual experience provides a non-doxastic foundation for perceptual beliefs about physical objects.

Foundationalism, as a theory of justification and knowledge, is often associated with Enlightenment rationality, the Cartesian thirst for certainty, and the modern assumption of the objectivity and universality of reason. Because of these associations, scholars in various fields have disdained foundationalism in favor of some sort of non-foundationalist/post-modern approach to knowledge and justification. This present book is one piece of a much wider conversation that hopes to motivate a renewed look at foundationalism. Of course, the foundationalism on offer has settled down quite a bit from its surly forbears. This more mild-mannered foundationalism suggests that our beliefs about reality can be held with confidence and yet these beliefs remain open to criticism and revision. It is this type of epistemology that provides a constructive basis for investigation and research while nevertheless encouraging a cognitive humility about our claims to possess truth.